Towards a European Supervisory Authority by Vercher-Moll, Javier
University of Connecticut 
OpenCommons@UConn 
Connecticut Insurance Law Journal School of Law 
2014 
Towards a European Supervisory Authority 
Javier Vercher-Moll 
Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/cilj 
 Part of the Insurance Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Vercher-Moll, Javier, "Towards a European Supervisory Authority" (2014). Connecticut Insurance Law 
Journal. 137. 
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/cilj/137 
TOWARDS A EUROPEAN SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY 
JAVIER VERCHER-MOLL1 
 
*** 
Regulation (EU) no. 1094/2010, which established a European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, may involve a major 
change to the management and supervision of private insurance in Spain 
and in the European Union.  Thus, this Article analyzes the evolution from 
the original Insurance Committee, which boasted only advisory functions, 
to this new Authority, which has been given decision-making functions in 
addition to its advisory ones.  The Article concludes by suggesting that in 
the future, this new Authority will be the sole supervisory body operating in 
all Member States, demonstrating a progression towards a new conception 
of supervision and regulation of insurance or perhaps another step towards 
Community-wide integration. 
*** 
 
Key Words: European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The ideals which inspired the realisation of a common market and 
the creation, thereby, of the European Economic Community, have meant 
that the principle of harmonization has been a constant in the drawing up of 
both national and Community regulatory frameworks in many sectors.  The 
relationship between Community law and the internal laws of each 
Member State has made it possible to distinguish four functional principles, 
which constitute the common central feature of the various different 
legislative reforms carried out within the European Union.  The 
relationships of substitution, harmonization, coordination and coexistence 
between internal national law and Community law have determined the 
shape and reach of a European standard, as translated into Treaties, 
Regulations, and Directives.2 
                                                                                                                 
1 Researcher of Commercial Law, CEGEA, Universidad Politécnica de 
Valencia, javermol@upv.es 
2 See FERNANDO DIEZ MORENO, MANUAL DE DERECHO DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA 
299-321 (5th ed, 2009); NIAL FENNELLY, THE PAST AND FUTURE OF EU LAW 37-
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Within the broad spectrum of sectors of economic activity, we can 
find in the insurance sector a well-ensconced and clear distinction in terms 
of private and public law.  On the one hand, the private relationships that 
arise between insurers and policyholders, insured parties, consumers, or 
users in general, are based on private law.  This, in turn, is subject to the 
corresponding legal restrictions governing contracts, which may be 
established for the benefit of the latter parties.  On the other hand, there is 
regulation of the insurers themselves; standard principles of public law that 
regulate and supervise insurance activity, and finally, norms governing the 
mediation or distribution of insurance risk. 
The harmonization of the norms relating to financial services that 
has been carried out to date (which include those governing insurance) has 
had as its single objective the achievement of a Single Market in Financial 
Services3 as an essential part of the common market.  This harmonization 
has only affected the standards concerned with supervision and regulation, 
not only by the creation of positive legislation, but also through the creation 
of Community institutions.  However, this should not lead us to think that 
such a combination of standards is ideal, since the set of standards relating 
to supervision still retains features that are specific to each Member State’s 
own system.4 
With the aim of overcoming this imperfect coordination between 
national standards,5 major efforts have been made in the direction of 
bringing together and unifying the codes.  Out of one of these has emerged 
Regulation (EU) no. 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the 
European Council of 24 November 2010, which establishes a European 
Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority) as the highest authority overseeing the regulation and 
supervision of private insurance at Community level. 
                                                                                                                 
85 (Miguel P. Maduro et al. eds., 2010); ANTONIO CALVO HORNERO, 
ORGANIZACIÓN DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA 174-84 (3rd ed. 2008). 
3 See RYM AYADI & CHRISTOPHER O’BRIEN, THE FUTURE OF INSURANCE 
REGULATION AND SUPERVISION IN THE EU: NEW DEVELOPMENTS, NEW 
CHALLENGES 53-60 (2006).   
4 See LUIS FERNANDEZ DE LA GANDARA & ALFONSO-LUIS CALVO 
CARAVACA, DERECHO MERCANTIL INTERNACIONAL: ESTUDIOS SOBRE DERECHO 
COMUNITARIO Y DEL COMERCIO INTERNACIONAL 217-24 (2d ed. 1995). 
5 See Juan Bataller Grau, Un Mercado Europeo del Seguro: Claves para una 
Re-visión, in DERECHO PRIVADO EUROPEO 747–49 (Sergio Cámara Lapuente ed., 
2003). 
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We should emphasize that the European Commission has played a 
major role in the achievement of this shared standard.  The mechanism 
employed has been the creation of Committees as consultative bodies in 
respect of insurance and occupational pension issues, and supervision.  
This has led to the creation of a very useful body of material for overseeing 
the Community’s insurance market.  Together with this, we should also not 
overlook the Lamfalussy process,6 which was initiated in 2001 and aimed 
to facilitate the coordination of individual national legislations in terms of 
supervision. 
Our objective in this study is to set out the juridical significance of 
the creation of this Authority and to determine, or at least clarify, the 
resulting situation with respect to national legislations on insurance 
supervision.  The Article starts out by providing a chronological account of 
the sequence of distinct stages of regulation in the Community that have 
led to the Regulation, which is the object of the present study.  This is why 
we dwell on an analysis of the most important community standards, as 
well as on reports, briefings on political contexts, and situations in which 
there has been an oversight of insurance in the European Union, leading up 
to the establishment of the new regulatory regime. 
 
II. ANTECEDENTS 
 
The European Council,7 in the knowledge that the directives 
relating to the insurance market had to be implemented, decided that it was 
necessary to create an institution to support the European Commission.8 In 
this respect, the Council Directive of 19 December 19919 established that 
“Whereas implementing measures are necessary for the application of 
Council directives on non-life insurance and life assurance; whereas, in 
particular, technical adaptations may from time to time be necessary to 
take account of developments in the insurance sector.”  This led to the 
creation of the first institution whose task was to advise the Commission on 
                                                                                                                 
6 For discussion of the Lamfalussy process, see infra Section VI. 
7 See JUAN MANUEL URUBURU COLSA, HISTORIA DEL CONSEJO EUROPEO, 
163–224 (2009); GUY ISAAC, MANUAL DE DERECHO COMUNITARIO GENERAL 63–
70 (4th ed. 1997). 
8 See Council Decision 87/373, art. 2, 1987 O.J. (L 197) 33, 35 (EC) 
(presenting procedures for implementing powers conferred on the Commission). 
9 Council Directive 91/675, 1991 O.J. (L 374) 32, 33 (EC). 
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developing legislation in the insurance sphere: appositely named, ‘the 
Insurance Committee.”10 
The Insurance Committee was composed of representatives of the 
Member States and chaired by the representative of the Commission.11 Its 
main function, beyond establishing its internal regulation, was to issue an 
opinion on the draft legislation that the Commission’s representative would 
submit to it.  In brief, the procedure was as follows: where the European 
Council, in the acts which it adopts in the field of direct non-life insurance 
and direct life assurance, confers on the Commission powers for the 
implementation of the rules which it lays down,12 the Commission presents 
a draft of the measures, for which the Committee must deliver its opinion 
within a time limit, which the chairman of the Committee may lay down.13 
Furthermore, the Committee held powers, beyond those we have 
already seen, to examine any question relating to the application of 
Community regulations relating to the insurance sector and, in particular, 
directives concerning direct insurance.14 It could issue opinions on matters 
on which it was consulted by the Commission on the basis of the new 
proposals that it intended to present to the Council in relation to 
coordination in the sectors of direct life assurance and direct non-life 
insurance.  It had no powers, at any time or in any circumstances, to 
consider particular problems in connection with individual insurance 
companies, with the result that the Committee’s direct intervention in the 
insurance market, through reports or recommendations, was precluded.15 
The Commission Communication of 11 May 1999,16 entitled 
"Action Plan for a Single Financial Market," established a series of 
objectives and specific measures for improving the single market in 
                                                                                                                 
10 See JAVIER CAMACHO DE LOS RIOS, ARMONIZACIÓN DEL DERECHO DE 
SEGURO DE DAÑOS EN LA UNIÓN EUROPEA 38-39 (1996). 
11 Council Directive 91/675, art. 1, 1991 O.J. (L 374) 32, 33 (EC). 
12 Id. at art. 2.1. 
13 Id. at art. 2.2. 
14 The expression “direct insurance” is usually used to refer to the premiums 
obtained through direct contracting with the insured. It must be distinguished of 
reinsurance contract, because the reinsurance is based in giving protection between 
insurers. In the reinsurance, an insurer gives protection to another insurer if it 
cannot cover the risk assumed in the insurance contract with the insured. 
15 Council Directive 91/675, art. 3, 1991 O.J. (L 374) 32, 33 (EC). 
16 Financial Services Commission Proposed Action Plan for Single Financial 
Market, COM (1999) 327 final (May 11, 1999). 
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financial services.17 Strategic measures aimed to create a single market in 
wholesale financial services, the development of open, secure, retail 
financial service markets, to guarantee the stability of EU financial markets 
by using best practices in the matter of preventative and supervisory 
regulation, and finally, to eliminate the fiscal obstacles to financial market 
integration.  One of the Commission’s main objectives was to achieve 
conformity with the Framework for Action18 that the Commission itself had 
presented in October 1998, given that the introduction of the Euro was one 
of the main foundations on which the single market would be built.  
However, in addition, there was also the key matter of restructuring the 
financial services sector, since the conflicting national legislations did not 
provide a stable legal framework.19 
Leading on from this, one of the immediate consequences of these 
was the harmonization of the different national legislations in those areas 
that, although not specifically concerned with financial services, were 
intrinsically related, since they affected the clients of these services.  In 
effect, adaptation, specialisation, and technical and legal improvements 
have consistently characterized developments in consumer and user 
protection legislation right up to the present day. 
 
III. THE CREATION OF NEW COMMITTEES 
 
Continuing the historical progress, on 17 July 2000, the European 
Council set up the so-called Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of 
European Securities Markets.  In its final report, the Committee of Wise 
Men called for the establishment of a four-level regulatory framework in 
order to make the regulatory process for Community securities legislation 
more flexible, effective, and transparent.20 In its Resolution, the Stockholm 
European Council of 23 and 24 March 2001 welcomed the report of the 
Committee of Wise Men and called for a four-level approach to be 
                                                                                                                 
17 Id. at 1 (quoting Mario Monti, the Financial Services Commissioner: it is 
“crucial that the Single Market for financial services delivers its full potential for 
consumers, in terms of a broad range of safe, competitive products, and for 
industry, in terms inter alia of easier access to a single deep and liquid market for 
investment capital, as well as for financial service operators themselves”).  
18 Financial Services Commission Proposed Framework for Action, COM 
(1999) 941 final (Oct. 28, 1998). 
19 See PAUL P. CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, E.U. LAW. TEXT, CASES AND 
MATERIALS 604–35 (4th ed. 2008). 
20 For discussion of the Lamfalussy process, see infra Section VI. 
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implemented.21 The object of postulating these four levels was none other 
than to establish an integrated securities market which required action on 
legislation, on implementation measures, implantation in national law, and 
measures to ensure compliance with the laws issued by the competent 
Community authorities. 
The organizations created by the European Commission were set 
up to establish appropriate teams of staff with the technical resources to 
carry out the task of producing recommendations and advice as to how the 
convergence of the national laws should be achieved.  The gradual 
construction of this network of supranational institutions continued, and it 
was in June 2001 that the Commission adopted new Decisions,22 which 
established the Committee of European Securities Regulators and the 
European Securities Committee, respectively.  Both Committees were 
designed to function as independent entities to reflect upon, debate, and 
provide advice about issues relating to securities for the Commission.  
They were also to contribute to the coherent, exact, and timely application 
of Community legislation in the Member States, ensuring more effective 
cooperation between national supervisory authorities, and carrying out 
evaluations with respect to consistency and good practice.  They were to 
organize their own operating systems, and maintain close operating links 
with the Commission and the European Securities Committee.  Finally, 
they were to set up their own internal regulations and fully respect both the 
institutional prerogatives and the institutional balance established by the 
Treaty.23 Furthermore, in particular, the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators was charged with consulting widely and at an early date, with 
parties active in the market, the consumers and ultimate users, in an open 
and transparent manner.24 As to their composition, with the aim of 
                                                                                                                 
21 For a more thorough discussion of the legal reasons in favor of establishing 
a new organizational structure for financial services committees, see Council 
Directive 2005/1, ¶ 1–4, 2005 O.J. (L 79) 9 (EU). 
22 Commission Decision 2001/527, 2001 O.J. (L 191) 43, 44 (EC); 
Commission Decision 2001/528, 2001 O.J. (L 191) 45, 46 (EC). 
23 Compare Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 1 with, 
Treaty of Nice, Feb. 25, 2001, 2001 O.J. (C 80) 1. 
24 Commission Decision 2001/527, (8)–(12), 2001 O.J. (L 191) 43 (EC) (“(8) 
The Committee of European Securities Regulators should serve as an independent 
body for reflection, debate and advice for the Commission in the securities field. 
(9) The Committee of European Securities Regulators should also contribute to the 
consistent and timely implementation of Community legislation in the Member 
States by securing more effective cooperation between national supervisory 
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facilitating regulatory convergence, the Commission indicated in both 
Decisions that membership of these organizations should consist of high-
level representatives from the national public authorities competent in the 
field of securities. 
As we can see, both the European Council and the Commission 
were of the view that the establishment of Committees made up of 
qualified national representatives represented a significant element in 
promoting the regulatory convergence of the different national bodies of 
legislation.  The objective was clear: to smooth away difficulties with the 
aim of creating regulatory uniformity, and of drawing up a single text 
applicable in all Member States. 
 
IV. THE GRADUAL CONSTRUCTION OF A SINGLE MARKET 
 
The European Parliament has also pointed out, on numerous 
occasions, that the creation of a single market in financial services, 
consistent with an open market and free competition, is crucial for 
increasing economic growth and for the creation of employment in the 
Community. In 2002, it approved Resolutions for each,25 which defined the 
regulatory framework for the four level approach concerning the regulation 
of European securities markets, and sought to broaden certain aspects of 
this approach to apply to the banking and insurance sectors, following the 
clear commitment on the part of the European Council to guarantee an 
appropriate institutional balance. 
                                                                                                                 
authorities, carrying out peer reviews and promoting best practice. (10) The 
Committee of European Securities Regulators should organise its own operational 
arrangements and maintain close operational links with the Commission and the 
European Securities Committee. It should elect its chairperson from among its 
members. (11) The Committee of European Securities Regulators should consult 
extensively and at an early stage with market participants, consumers and end-
users in an open and transparent manner. (12) The Committee of European 
Securities Regulators should draw up its own rules of procedure and fully respect 
the prerogatives of the institutions and the institutional balance established by the 
Treaty.”). Commission Decision 2001/528, (9)–(10), 2001 O.J. (L191) 45 (EC) 
(“(9) The European Securities Committee should serve as a body for reflection, 
debate and advice for the Commission in the field of securities. (10) The European 
Securities Committee should adopt its own rules of procedure.”). 
25 See generally Resolution on Prudential Supervision in the European Union, 
EUR. PARL. DOC. (2001/2247 (INI)); EUR. PARL. DOC. (2002/2061(INI)). 
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The Resolution dated 5 February 2002, was extremely important in 
terms of legislative procedure, of transparency for the different parties 
operating in the financial services market,26 and in the right of supervision.  
The Parliament itself urged, with a view to speed up the establishment of 
an integrated securities market, that the deadlines for the transposition of 
Community acts into national law should be reduced.  Furthermore, in 
relation to transparency27 it considered it essential that the general public 
should be able to access, particularly via the Internet, as much information 
as possible about all the legislative initiatives and activities of the 
committees, in particular those of the market regulators committee. 
Regarding the second European Parliament Resolution, of 21 
November 2002, this put forward the view that the series of financial 
scandals in the United States evidenced the failure of the United States’ 
regulatory network to eliminate the risk of sudden and unexpected financial 
crises.  Consequently, they concluded that there was absolutely nothing to 
suggest that Europe was immune to these dramatic crises, especially 
considering that Europe was in a transitional stage while in the process of 
moving from a fragmented system of individual national markets to a 
single unified financial market; a transition that today, with the first decade 
of the twenty-first century already in the past, is still not complete.  
The Parliament understood that the supervision of insurance 
companies and pension funds should be brought together, without 
prejudicing the distinct characteristics of each, while respecting the 
national structures that were already optimal, since the ability of national 
banking and insurance systems to survive – or not – in the enormously 
volatile climate of those years would provide a useful indication of the 
relative efficiency of the national supervisory systems.  Furthermore, with 
regard to the subject of the present study, the Parliament required that 
national supervisory agencies should focus on “real time supervision” of 
financial organizations but without succumbing to the temptation to 
constantly interfere with the business actually at hand, since this would 
both create obstacles to innovation and would place risks of an ethical 
nature before the senior executives of the institutions under supervision. 
                                                                                                                 
26 See generally José Miguel Rodríguez Fernández, Los Conglomerados 
Financieros y su Supervisión: Una Perspectiva en el Contexto de la Unión 
Europea, 31 REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS EUROPEOS 71, 75–96 (2002), available at 
http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/232.  
27 See Commission Regulation 1049/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 145) 43 (EC).  
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Finally, on December 3, 2002, the European Council invited the 
Commission to apply these agreements in the areas of banking, insurance 
and occupational pensions, and to create new committees with a 
consultative remit in relation to these areas of activity as soon as possible.  
Subsequently, on 5 November 2003, the Commission adopted Decision 
2004/9/EC,28 which established the European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Committee.  However, its implementation was also dependent on 
a Directive deleting the purely consultative functions of the Insurance 
Committee.29 
In conclusion, coupled with the creation of the Committees, it was 
imperative to acquire a firm commitment on the part of the Member States.  
In effect, overcoming the fragmentation of the market and promoting 
convergence by respecting transition deadlines, for example, were 
unconditional obligations.  As we can see, the first years of the twenty-first 
century represent an important milestone on the way to the achievement of 
the single market, but also show insufficient progress to date in the field of 
financial services. 
 
                                                                                                                 
28 Commission Decision 2004/9, 2004 O.J. (L 3) 34 (EC). The reader has to 
distinguish the Decision 2004/9/EC and the Decision 2004/6/EC. The first one 
refers to the “European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Committee,” and the 
second one refers to the “Committee of European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Supervisors.” 
29 Id. at (5) (“The Commission has proposed a Directive modifying, inter alia, 
Directive 91/675/EEC, First Council Directive 73/239/EEC of 24 July 1973 on the 
coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the 
taking-up and pursuit of the business of direct insurance other than life assurance 
(4) as amended, Directive 2002/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 5 November 2002 concerning life assurance (5), and Directive 
2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2002 
on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and 
investment firms in a financial conglomerate and amending Council Directives 
73/239/EEC, 79/267/EEC, 92/49/EEC, 92/96/EEC, 93/6/EEC and 93/22/EEC, and 
Directives 98/78/EC and 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and the Council 
(6), to delete the advisory functions of the Insurance Committee.”).  
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V.  THE EUROPEAN INSURANCE AND OCCUPATIONAL 
PENSIONS COMMITTEE PURSUANT TO COMMISSION 
DECISION 2004/9/EC OF 5 NOVEMBER 2003 
 
Moreover, we should remember that the European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Committee did not begin to function30 until a 
Directive repealing the purely consultative functions of the Insurance 
Committee came into force.  With respect to this, Directive 2005/1/EC31 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2005 fulfils that 
mandate. 
Article 5 of this latter Directive amended Directive 91/675/EEC, 
with regard to the powers assumed by the Insurance Committee, and 
renamed it the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Committee.  
This more elaborate denomination for the new incarnation of the Insurance 
Committee had the purpose of clarifying its sphere of activity in relation to 
the old Insurance Committee. 
 
A. LEGAL AUTHORITY 
 
Reading the text of the articles of Decision 2004/9/EC, I deduce 
that the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Committee has two 
types of legal authority.  The first covered its own organization and dealt 
with its internal structure and procedural regime while the second dealt 
with its actual substantive functions, which were meant to establish, in 
addition to the actual attributed powers themselves, the objectives that it 
should pursue. 
In relation to the first type of legal authority, in its Decision the 
Commission lays down that the Committee shall be composed of high- 
level representatives of Member States, and chaired by a representative of 
the Commission.  But the Decision does not specify who these high level 
representatives shall be, or the method of their appointment, leaving this at 
the discretion of the Committee itself.  On the other hand, the Decision did 
                                                                                                                 
30 See id. at art. 5. 
31 See Commission Decision 2009/79, (2), 2009 O.J. (L 25) 28 (EC) (referring 
to “Directive 2005/1/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 9 
March 2005, amending Directives 73/239/EEC, 85/611/EEC, 91/675/EEC, 
92/49/EEC and 93/6/EEC of the Council and Directives 94/19/EC, 98/78/EC, 
2000/12/EC, 2001/34/EC, 2002/83/EC and 2002/87/EC, in order to establish a new 
organisational structure for financial services committees”).  
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take away from the Committee the power to appoint its own secretariat, 
since this was incumbent on the Commission itself.  As per its rules of 
procedure, the Decision empowered the Committee to draw up its own 
internal rules of procedure, but it also imposed an obligation to meet both 
at regular intervals and impulsively whenever the situation demanded. 
Furthermore, the Commission had the power to convene an emergency 
meeting if it considered that the situation so required.32 
With regards to its substantive functions, the Committee was 
authorized to advise the Commission, at the latter’s request, “on policy 
issues relating to insurance, reinsurance and occupational pensions as well 
as Commission proposals in these fields,” and to examine “any question 
relating to the application of Community provisions concerning the sectors 
of insurance, reinsurance and occupational pensions, and in particular 
Directives on insurance, reinsurance and occupational pensions.”  The 
Decision denied the Committee decision-making powers relating to 
specific matters concerned with, or affecting, the Community’s business 
organizations and citizens.  In effect, the Committee could not consider 
specific problems relating to individual insurance or reinsurance 
undertakings, nor to occupational pensions institutions, nor could it address 
labour and social law aspects such as the organization of occupational 
regimes, in particular compulsory membership and the results of collective 
bargaining agreements.33 
 
B. RELATED CONCEPTS 
 
It is important to avoid confusing the different Committees 
operating at that time within the European Commission.  In effect, and 
quite distinct from the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Committee, which is the subject of this Article, at that time was the 
Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors, 
which was instituted on 5 November 2003.  The confusion of the two even 
affected the wording of Decision 2004/9/EC itself, as evidenced by the 
reference to the Committee of Supervisors, when Article 3.2 mentions the 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Committee. 
According to Article 2 of Decision 2004/6/EC, the functions of the 
Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors 
                                                                                                                 
32 See Commission Decision 2004/9, art. 3, 4, 2004 O.J. (L 25) 28, 30–31 
(EU).  
33 See id. at art. 2.  
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are first to advise the Commission, either at the Commission’s request, 
within a time limit which the Commission may lay down according to the 
urgency of the matter, or on the Committee’s own initiative, in particular 
regarding the preparation of draft implementing measures in the fields of 
insurance, reinsurance, and occupational pensions. Secondly, it shall 
contribute to the consistent implementation of Community Directives, and 
to the convergence of Member States’ supervisory practices throughout the 
Community.  Finally, it shall constitute a forum for supervisory 
cooperation, including the exchange of information on supervised 
institutions. 
Besides, the Article 4 of Decision 2004/6/EC established that “the 
Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors 
shall maintain close operational links with the Commission and with the 
Committee established by Decision 2004/9/EC”; which is to say, with the 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Committee.  This meant 
that there were two institutions with similar titles, practically identical 
functions, and the power to report on the same matters.34 This state of 
affairs was later changed with the publication of Commission Decision 
2009/79/EC, broadening the powers of the Committee of Supervisors. 
From a reading of the articles contained in both Decisions, we can 
draw the conclusion that there are no major differences in terms of their 
functions.  It is certainly the case that Decision number 9 creates a 
Committee whose purpose is to advise on insurance policy and to scrutinize 
Community standards in this area.  By contrast, Decision number 6 also 
addresses insurance, but from a supervisory perspective. In our view, there 
is no substantial difference between the two bodies because there is no 
demarcation of any clear division of powers between them.  It was 
unnecessary to establish two Committees, since their functions could have 
been brought together in one, thereby avoiding the misunderstandings that 
might arise in the dealings between the two organizations. 
On the other hand, it could be argued that there is a point to 
creating two separate Committees, if we consider that the European 
Committee of Supervisors establishes the basis of what would later 
constitute the supervisory institutions that are the subject of the present 
study. In effect, Decision 2004/6/EC was repealed by Commission 
Decision 2009/79/EC, and the latter, in turn, by the Regulation whereby a 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority was created. 
What is certain is that, if we analyze the three regulations mentioned, we 
                                                                                                                 
34 Id. at art. 3.2. 
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see that each organization takes on the responsibilities of its predecessor, 
and increases its powers.  This is demonstrated by the fact that the new 
European Authority has the previous Committees’ consultative functions 
and, as we shall see, in a new development it is given certain powers of 
decision, which enable us to glimpse the likely shape of a future Financial 
Services Supervisory Authority. 
 
VI. THE LAMFALUSSY PROCESS35 
 
The Lamfalussy process36 began in 2001, with the intention of 
establishing an effective mechanism to enable European supervisory 
practices to begin to converge, and to ensure that Community financial 
services legislation would be able to adapt, rapidly and flexibly, to the 
evolution of the internal market.  A consequence of this was the issuing of 
Commission Decision 2004/6/EC which, as we have already seen, 
established a Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Supervisors, in the guise of an “independent body for reflection, debate and 
advice for the Commission in the insurance, reinsurance and occupational 
pensions’ fields.”37 
Within this process, in 2004 when the legislative phase of the 
Financial Services Action Plan (“FSAP”) was almost complete, the 
Commission decided to carry out an evaluation of the integration of 
European financial markets and to instigate a general consultation, based 
on the reports of four high level groups of experts.  The Green Paper on 
Financial Services Policy, with which a public consultation was launched 
on May 3, 2005, was fundamentally centered on the application of existing 
measures and in cooperation, rather than in putting forward proposals for 
new laws.  The Green Paper on Financial Services Policy (2005-2010)38 set 
forth the general policy objectives39 for financial services for the period 
2005 to 2010.  The purpose of this Paper was none other than to 
                                                                                                                 
35 See generally Duncan Alford, The Lamfalussy Process and EU Bank 
Regulation: Another Step on the Road to Pan-European Regulation?, 25 ANN. 
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 389, 389–416 (2006). 
36 It takes its name from the President of the advisory committee that set it up 
in March 2001, Alexandre Lamfalussy. 
37 See Commission Decision 2004/6, (4), 2004 O.J. (L 3) 31 (EU). 
38 Commission Green Paper on Financial Services Policy 2005-2010, COM 
(2005) 177 final (May 5, 2005).  
39 Id. at 3 (indicating that the Paper merely sets out “preliminary views of the 
Commission for its financial services policy priorities”).  
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consolidate the progress towards an integrated, open, competitive, 
economically efficient European financial market, and to remove any 
remaining economically significant barriers to it.  It sought to stimulate the 
development of a market in which financial services and capital could 
circulate freely throughout the EU at the lowest possible cost (with 
adequate and effective levels of prudential control, financial stability, and 
strong consumer protection).  Further, it would apply, enforce, and carry 
out continuous evaluation of the existing legislative framework, rigorously 
implement the optimal regulatory agenda for any future initiatives, further 
supervisory convergence, and consolidate Europe’s influence in global 
financial markets. 
The White Paper that emerged from it was designated for 
integrating the financial services market as its highest priority.  In the 
White Paper on Financial Services 2005-201040 of December 1, the 
Commission established the key objectives of its policy for the following 
five years, namely, consolidating progress achieved to date, completing 
unfinished business, enhancing supervisory cooperation and convergence, 
and removing the remaining barriers to integration.  But more than this, in 
the document the following priorities were laid down: to continue to 
improve the efficiency of pan-European markets for long-term savings 
products, to establish the retail internal market, and improve the efficacy of 
the risk capital market. 
The dynamic consolidation of financial services was based on the 
principle of producing better legislation by mandatory open consultation, 
and of impact analyses for new legislative proposals as central procedural 
features, as well as the ex-post evaluation of all legislative measures.  
Furthermore, the EC regulatory and supervisory structures were subject to 
review with the aim of improving their effectiveness in achieving 
convergence.  Finally, taking into account the international context in 
which today’s regulation on accounting practice, audit, and capital and 
reserves is set, the EU was of the view that it was essential for it to 
undertake a major role in the worldwide process of standardization and, 
specifically, in favor of opening up world markets for financial services.  
The Commission at this time proposed a dialogue between the EU and US 
financial markets, and to broaden the cooperation to include other 
countries, such as Japan, China, Russia, and India.  The EU was desired to 
be very visibly represented in international organizations, and was to speak 
                                                                                                                 
40 Commission White Paper on Financial Services Policy 2005-2010, COM 
(2005) 629 final (Dec. 1, 2005).  
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with a single voice on complex matters such as money laundering, the 
financing of terrorism, and tax fraud. 
In accordance with this new approach, financial regulation was 
initially passed in two levels.  But subsequent to the major reform 
introduced by Directive 2005/1/EC, the Lamfalussy process envisioned EU 
financial regulation as unfolding in four distinct levels or phases.  
At Level 1, framework legislation setting out the core principles 
and defining implementing powers would be adopted by co-decision by 
European Parliament and the European Council,41 after a full and inclusive 
consultation process in line with the best regulatory practices. 
At Level 2, the technical details of the legislation would be adopted 
after a vote of the competent regulatory Committee (the European 
Securities Committee, the European Banking Committee, and the European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Committee).42 
At Level 3, these three Committees would have an important role 
to contribute to consistent and convergent implementation of EU directives 
by securing more effective cooperation between national supervisors and 
the convergence of supervisory practices. 
Finally, in Level 4, the Commission would enforce the timely and 
correct transposition of EU legislation into national law level.43 
 
VII. REVIEW OF THE LAMFALUSSY PROCESS 
 
In line with the aforementioned Directive 2005/1/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2005 amending 
Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 85/611/EEC, 91/675/EEC, 92/49/EEC and 
93/6/EEC, and Directives 94/19/EC, 98/78/EC, 2000/12/EC, 2001/34/EC, 
2002/83/EC and 2002/87/EC in order to establish a new organizational 
structure for financial services committees, the Commission carried out a 
review of the Lamfalussy process in 2007 and presented its assessment in a 
                                                                                                                 
41 Nowadays, that process is known as “Ordinary Legislative Procedure.” 
42 See Commission Decision 2001/527, 2001 O.J. (L 191) 43 (EC) amended by 
Commission Decision 2004/6, 2004 O.J. (L 3) 32 (EU); Commission Decision 
2004/5, 2004 O.J. (L3) 28 (EU); Commission Decision 2004/6, 2004 O.J. (L3) 30 
(EU).  
43 See Communication from the Commission to the Council and European 
Parliament, at 1–2, COM (2007) 722 final (Nov. 20, 2007) (indicating where the 
Lamfalussy process is reviewed through the mandate established in Directive 
2005/1/EC).  
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Communication of 20 November 2007, entitled “Review of the Lamfalussy 
process — Strengthening supervisory convergence.” 
The Communication of 20 November 2007 detailed the current 
situation in terms of the four levels, and determined individual measures to 
mitigate the defects affecting each of the levels in Annex III.  The measures 
were calculated to improve both the legislative process itself and the 
application of the legislation.  This is why it was stated that Member States 
must refrain from adopting any additional national measures in those areas 
which, because of the legislative level of the Community regulation in 
question, transposition was required on the part of the Member States.  The 
fundamental objective was to increase transparency insofar as transposition 
was concerned.  This was based on levels 1 and 2 that we have already 
detailed. 
The measures contained in Annex III of the Communication were 
also designed to improve supervisory cooperation and convergence. What 
was essential was the strengthening of the level 3 Committees – the 
European Securities Committee, the European Banking Committee, and the 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Committee.  From a 
political perspective, the Committees were expected to deliver more results, 
and the national supervisors were expected to expand their missions to 
include a cooperation and convergence requirement at European level.  The 
hope was that reducing the practical obstacles at European and national 
levels would strengthen mutual trust and the implementation of the 
measures.  Decision-making, especially of the Committees of Regulators, 
would also be facilitated and carry more authority (even if non-binding) in 
relation to the national regulators and supervisors.44 
While reviewing the functionality of the Lamfalussy process, the 
European Council45 invited the Commission to clarify the role of the 
Committees of Supervisors and consider all different options to strengthen 
the working of those Committees, without upsetting the current 
institutional structure or reducing the accountability of supervisors. 
During its meeting of March 13 and 14, 2008, the European 
Council called for swift improvements to the functioning of the 
Committees of Supervisors.  
                                                                                                                 
44 See id. at 6.  
45 See, e.g., Press Release 15698/07, Council of European Union, Emp’t, Soc. 
Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs  (Dec. 4, 2007), available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/ docs/pressData/en/ecofin/9 
7420.pdf.  
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On May 14, 2008, the European Council invited the Commission 
to revise the Commission Decisions establishing the Committees of 
Supervisors to ensure coherence and consistency in their mandates and 
tasks as well as strengthen their contributions to supervisory cooperation 
and convergence.  The Council noted that specific tasks could be explicitly 
given to the Committees to foster supervisory cooperation and 
convergence, and their role in assessing risks to financial stability.46 
To summarize, the idea of broadening the Committees’ powers was 
clear.  The Commission itself called for the political will that was inherent 
in the Committees’ development, and this already showed signs of the 
changes in responsibility and function that these institutions would 
undergo. 
 
VIII.  THE COMMITTEE OF EUROPEAN INSURANCE AND 
OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS SUPERVISORS PURSUANT TO 
COMMISSION DECISION 2009/79/EC OF 23 JANUARY 2009 
 
Article 16 of Decision 2009/79/EC repealed Decision 2004/6/EC 
and defined a new configuration for the Committee of Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Supervisors by broadening its powers and 
responsibilities, starting from the premise that it was not a decision-making 
body, since it had no regulatory powers at Community level.  All in all, its 
function was to carry out peer reviews, to promote best practices, and to 
issue non-binding guidelines, recommendations and standards in order to 
increase convergence across the Community, contributing to the common 
and uniform day-to-day implementation of Community legislation and its 
consistent application by the supervisory authorities. 
The Committee of Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Supervisors was constituted as an independent advisory group of the 
Commission in the insurance, reinsurance, and occupational pensions fields 
– although, in this latter case, the Decision made it clear that it should not 
address labour and social law aspects, such as the organization of 
occupational regimes, and in particular, issues relating to compulsory 
membership (affiliation) or collective agreements. 
                                                                                                                 
46 See Commission Decision 2009/79, (4)–(6), 2009 O.J. (L 25) 28 (EU). 
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On the other hand, the Committee’s mandate should cover the 
supervision of financial conglomerates.47 To avoid duplication of work, to 
prevent any inconsistencies, to keep the Committee abreast of progress, and 
to give it the opportunity to exchange information, the Committee was 
instructed to work with the Committee of European Banking Supervisors in 
the supervision of financial conglomerates, to be exercised thorough the 
Joint Committee on Financial Conglomerates.48 
Financial systems in the Community are closely linked and events 
in one Member State can have a significant impact on financial institutions 
and markets in other Member States.  The continuing emergence of 
financial conglomerates and the blurring of distinctions between the 
activities of firms in the banking, securities, and insurance sectors give rise 
to additional supervisory challenges at the national and Community level.  
In order to safeguard financial stability, a system is needed at the level of 
the Committee of Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors, the 
Committee of European Banking Supervisors, and the Committee of 
European Securities Regulators in order to identify potential risks, across 
borders and across sectors, at an early stage and where necessary, to inform 
the Commission and the other Committees.  Furthermore, it is essential that 
the Committee keep finance ministries and national central banks of the 
Member States informed. The Committee has its role to play in this respect 
by identifying risks in the insurance, reinsurance, and occupational pension 
sectors and regularly reporting on the outcome to the Commission. The 
Council should also be informed of these assessments. 
A.  FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMITTEE OF EUROPEAN INSURANCE 
AND OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS SUPERVISORS 
From reading the articles in the Decision, we can identify three 
main functions of the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Supervisors.  First, the Decision established a list of the 
Committee’s functions in relation to multilateral cooperation between 
national supervisory authorities, which it developed in great detail.  
Second, the Committee is invested with powers of technical advice.  The 
                                                                                                                 
47 Council Directive 2002/87, 2003 O.J. (L 35) 1 (EU) (defining financial 
conglomerates as “financial groups which provide services and products in 
different sectors of the financial markets”).  
48 See Commission Decision 2009/79, (7)–(10) 2009 O.J. (L 25), 25–26 (EU). 
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final function concerns the nature of the relationship between the 
Committee and the other supervisory Committees. 
Outside of these three functions, in accordance with Article 13, the 
Committee was to establish an annual work program and transmit it to the 
European Council, the European Parliament and the Commission by the 
end of October each year.  The Committee was to periodically and at least 
annually inform the Council, the European Parliament, and the 
Commission on the achievement of the activities set out in the work 
program. 
 
1. Cooperation Between Supervisory Authorities 
 
With respect to the first function, the review of the Lamfalussy 
process established that the Member States also have a key role to play in 
guaranteeing the full implementation of the standards and guidelines in 
relation to proposals designed to strengthen cooperation between home and 
host regulators.  The action of the Commission is intended to raise 
awareness, and evaluate and adopt measures (delegation of functions, 
protocol for multilateral agreements, functioning of the principal 
supervisory authority, etc.). 
On this basis, Article 4 of the Decision charged the Committee 
with one of its most important functions, which is to enhance cooperation 
between national supervisory authorities in the insurance, reinsurance, and 
occupational pensions fields and foster the convergence of Member States’ 
supervisory practices and approaches throughout the Community.  To this 
effect, it shall carry out the following tasks: 
a) mediate or facilitate mediation between supervisory authorities 
in cases specified in the relevant legislation or at the request of a 
supervisory authority; 
b) provide opinions to supervisory authorities in cases specified in 
the relevant legislation or at their request; 
c) promote the effective bilateral and multilateral exchange of 
information between supervisory authorities, subject to applicable 
confidentiality provisions; 
d) facilitate the delegation of tasks between supervisory authorities, 
in particular by identifying tasks can be delegated and by promoting best 
practices; 
e) contribute to ensuring the efficient and consistent functioning of 
colleges of supervisors, in particular through setting guidelines for the 
operational functioning of colleges, monitoring the coherence of the 
practices of the different colleges and sharing good practices; and 
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f) contribute to developing high quality and common supervisory 
reporting standards; 
g) review the practical application of the non-binding guidelines, 
recommendations and standards issued by the Committee. 
Additionally, within this same principle of convergence, the 
Committee was charged with reviewing the Member States’ supervisory 
practices and assess their convergence on an ongoing basis.  The 
Committee was to report annually on progress achieved and identify the 
remaining obstacles. 
The Committee was also charged with developing new practical 
convergence tools to promote the common supervisory approaches.  This is 
an extremely important role, calculated to compensate for any deficiencies 
in Directives, since these cannot prevent the existence, on occasion, of 
differences between the final legislations in the different Member States. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that the Decision emphasizes that 
the exchange of information between the supervisory authorities is 
fundamental to their functions.  This exchange is central to the efficient 
supervision of insurance groups and for financial stability.  While insurance 
legislation imposes clear legal obligations on supervisory authorities to 
cooperate and exchange information, the Committee was to facilitate 
practical day-to-day exchange of information between them, subject to 
relevant confidentiality provisions set out in applicable legislation.49 
 
2. The Committee’s Typical Function: Advising 
 
With respect to the second function, in Article 4, the Decision 
charges the Committee with a broad range of responsibilities for technical 
advice, in particular, with respect to the preparation of draft implementing 
measures in the fields of insurance, reinsurance, occupational pensions and 
financial conglomerates.  In this case, the Commission has the power to lay 
down the time limit within which the Committee shall provide such advice. 
Moreover, according to Articles 3 and 5, under the principle of 
convergence, the Committee shall contribute to the common and uniform 
implementation and consistent application of Community legislation by 
issuing guidelines, recommendations and standards.  In pursuit of this, it is 
given a power of active oversight, monitoring, and assessing developments 
in the insurance, reinsurance, and occupational pensions sector.  It is also to 
                                                                                                                 
49 See Commission Decision 2009/79, (15), (18), (19), 2009 O.J. (L 25) 29 
(EU).  
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ensure that the finance ministries and national central banks of the Member 
States are informed about potential or imminent problems. 
The Committee shall, at least twice a year, provide to the 
Commission assessments of micro-prudential trends, potential risks, and 
vulnerabilities in the insurance, reinsurance, and occupational pensions 
sector. 
 
3. Relationship Between Related Supervisors 
 
With respect to the third function, the Decision charged the 
Committee, not only with coordinating with the national supervisory 
authorities, but also with cooperating with the various institutions that carry 
out a similar task to that of the Committee in matters related to the financial 
framework.  In effect, Articles 5, 6, and 9 of the Decision state that the 
Committee shall cooperate closely with the Committee of European 
Securities Regulators, the Committee of European Banking Supervisors, 
and the Banking Supervision Committee of the European System of 
Central Banks, and contribute to the development of common supervisory 
practices in the field of insurance, reinsurance, and occupational pensions 
as well as on a cross-sectoral basis. 
To this effect, it was in particular to establish sectoral and cross-
sectoral training programmes to facilitate personnel exchanges and to 
encourage competent authorities to intensify the use of secondment 
schemes, joint inspection teams, and supervisory visits and other tools. 
 
B. COMPOSITION 
 
The Decision, in Article 7, states that the Committee shall be 
composed of high-level representatives from the national public authorities 
competent in the field of supervision of insurance, reinsurance, and 
occupational pensions.  Each Member State shall designate a high level 
representative from its competent authorities to participate in the meetings 
of the Committee.  The Decision does not define what is meant by a high 
level representative, which could lead to differences in interpretation on the 
part of the different Member States, and the consequent attendance of 
representatives with different levels of technical expertise, despite their all 
being “high level.”  The Chair shall be elected from among the Committee 
members. 
The members are enjoined not to disclose information covered by 
the obligation of professional secrecy.  All participants in the discussions 
shall be obliged to comply with the applicable rules of professional 
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secrecy.  Whenever the discussion of an item on the agenda should entail 
the exchange of confidential information concerning a supervised 
institution, participation in that discussion may be restricted to members 
directly involved. 
The Committee, according to Article 14, shall operate by 
consensus of its members.  If no consensus can be reached, a qualified 
majority shall make decisions.  The votes of the representatives of the 
Members of the Committee shall correspond to the votes of the Member 
States as laid down in Articles 205(2) and (4) of the Treaty.50 Finally, the 
Committee shall adopt its own rules of procedure, and organize its own 
operational arrangements. 
 
IX.  REGULATION (EU) NO. 1094/2010 OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL OF 24 NOVEMBER 
2010, ESTABLISHING A EUROPEAN SUPERVISORY 
AUTHORITY (EUROPEAN INSURANCE AND 
OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS AUTHORITY), AMENDING 
DECISION NO. 716/2009/EC AND REPEALING COMMISSION 
DECISION 2009/79/EC51 
 
The financial crisis that we are presently undergoing has exposed 
weaknesses in cooperation, coordination, and consistency in the application 
of Community law, and in the mutual confidence between national 
supervisors. 
The Commission, the Parliament, and the Council have always 
been aware that the Committees that have been established up to the 
present day have been no more than consultative bodies, with undoubted 
importance in relation to the quality of their technical advice, but without 
the power to take decisions.  However, the effort made in Decision 
2009/79/EC to set up the Committee as a body with a major impact in the 
field of insurance and occupational pensions supervision is praiseworthy. 
                                                                                                                 
50 Articles 205.2 and 205.4 should be read according to the amendments 
introduced by the Act of Accession of 2003, which introduces amendments to 
Primary Law, as a result of the Accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and of 
Romania to the European Union. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the 
European Union, Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C 321) 327. 
51 Commission Regulation 1092/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 48– 83. 
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On 25 February 2009, a group of experts, under the chairmanship 
of J. de Larosière, published a report52 at the behest of the Commission.  
The report concluded that the supervisory framework needed to be 
strengthened, and recommended the creation of a European System of 
Financial Supervisors, consisting of three European Supervisory 
Authorities: one in the insurance and occupational pensions sector, one in 
the banking sector, and the third in the securities sector, as well as a 
European Systemic Risk Board. 
The European Council, in its conclusions dated 19 June 2009, 
recommended the creation of a European System of Financial Supervisors, 
consisting of three new European Supervisory Authorities.  This system 
should focus on improving the quality and cohesiveness of national 
supervision, strengthening control over transnational business groups, and 
establishing a single EU rule book applicable to all financial institutions in 
the single market.  The European Council emphasized that the European 
Supervisory Authorities should also have supervisory powers for credit 
ratings agencies.  The Council invited the Commission to present concrete 
proposals as to the manner in which the European System of Financial 
Supervisors53 would be able to take firm action in critical situations, 
making the point that the decisions adopted by the European Supervisory 
Authorities should not have any effect on the budgetary responsibilities of 
the individual Member States. 
The European Supervisory Authorities are intended to replace the 
Committee of European Banking Supervisors established by Commission 
Decision 2009/78/EC, the Committee of European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Supervisors established by Commission Decision 
2009/79/EC, and the Committee of European Securities Regulators 
established by Commission Decision 2009/77/EC, and assume all the tasks 
and powers of those Committees.54 
                                                                                                                 
52 THE DE LAROSIÈRE GROUP, THE HIGH-LEVEL GROUP ON FINANCIAL 
SUPERVISION IN THE EU (Feb. 25, 2009). 
53 See A.J. Tapia Hermida, La Nueva Estructura Centralizada de Supervisión 
de los Mercados Financieros en la Unión Europea: Las Propuestas Regulatorias 
de la Comisión 23 de Septiembre de 2009 para la Creación del Consejo Europeo 
de Riesgo Sistémico y del Sistema Europeo de Supervisores Financieros, 116 
REVISTA DE DERECHO BANCARIO Y BURSÁTIL 209, 296–97 (2009). 
54 See Commission Regulation 1094/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 58 (EU). (“The 
Authority (EIOPA) shall form part of a European System of Financial Supervision 
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A.  UNDERLYING LEGAL AUTHORITY 
At the outset, it is necessary to consider the legislative approval 
process under which this new EIOPA is established.  Article 95 of the EC 
Treaty55 was chosen as the underpinning of its creation.  The purpose of 
this precept is to facilitate the actions of the Council, the Commission, and 
the Parliament, within their respective competences, with the objective of 
                                                                                                                 
(ESFS). The main objective of the ESFS shall be to ensure that the rules applicable 
to the financial sector are adequately implemented to preserve financial stability 
and to ensure confidence in the financial system as a whole and sufficient 
protection for the customers of financial services. The ESFS shall comprise the 
following: the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) for the purposes of the tasks 
as specified in Commission Regulation (EU) 1092/2010 and this Regulation; the 
Commission Authority (EIOPA); the European Supervisory Authority (European 
Banking Authority) established by Commission Regulation (EU) 1093/2010 and 
the European Parliament and of the Council; the European Supervisory Authority 
(European Securities and Markets Authority) established by Regulation (EU) 
1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council; the Joint Committee of 
the European Supervisory Authorities (Joint Committee) for the purposes of 
carrying out the tasks as specified in Articles 54 to 57 of this Regulation, of 
Commission Regulation (EU) 1093/2010 and of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010; 
the competent or supervisory authorities in the Member States as specified in the 
Union acts referred to in Article 1 of this Regulation, of Regulation (EU) No 
1093/2010 and of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. The Authority shall cooperate 
regularly and closely with the ESRB as well as with the European Supervisory 
Authority (European Banking Authority) and the European Supervisory Authority 
(European Securities and Markets Authority) through the Joint Committee, 
ensuring cross-sectoral consistency of work and reaching joint positions in the area 
of supervision of financial conglomerates and on other cross-sectoral issues. In 
accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation under Article 4 of the Treaty 
on European Union, the parties to the ESFS shall cooperate with trust and full 
mutual respect, in particular in ensuring the flow of appropriate and reliable 
information between them. Those supervisory authorities that are party to the 
ESFS shall be obliged to supervise financial institutions operating in the Union in 
accordance with the acts referred to in Article 1”). 
55 Today it is known as Article 114 in the consolidated versions of the Treaty 
on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as 
well as their Protocols and Annexes, resulting from the amendments introduced by 
the Treaty of Lisbon, signed on 13 December 2007 in Lisbon, that took effect on 1 
December 2009. Commission Regulation 1094/2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 94 (EU). 
2014 EUROPEAN SUPERVISORY 197 
 
assimilating the different national systems of legislation.56 The new 
Authority is established in accordance with the aforesaid, and by means of 
co-decision. 
However, the most important question is if the European 
Commission, Council, and Parliament have enough powers to create the 
EIOPA.  As an introduction, the Commission mentions in Legal Reason 16 
of the Proposal for a Regulation that the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities, in its Judgment of 2 May 2006 in case C-217/0457 (United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. European Parliament 
and Council of the European Union), acknowledges that Article 95 of the 
EC Treaty, relating to the adoption of measures for the assimilation of laws 
with a view to the establishment and functioning of the internal market, 
constitutes a sufficient legal basis for the creation of “a Community body 
responsible for contributing to the implementation of a process of 
harmonisation.”  Therefore, the purpose and tasks of the Authority – 
assisting competent national supervisory authorities in the consistent 
interpretation and application of Community rules and contributing to 
financial stability necessary for financial integration – are closely linked to 
the objectives of the Community acquis58 concerning the internal market 
for financial services.  The European Parliament and the European Council 
adopted this legal proof in Legal Reason 16 of the Regulation. 
                                                                                                                 
56 See T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN LAW COMMUNITY 
LAW 114–18 (5th ed. 2003). 
57 Case C-217/04, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. 
European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2006 O.J. (C 143) 8 
(EU).  
58 The Community acquis is the body of common rights and obligations which 
bind all the Member States together within the European Union. It is constantly 
evolving and comprises: the content, principles and political objectives of the 
Treaties; the legislation adopted in application of the treaties and the case law of 
the Court of Justice; the declarations and resolutions adopted by the Union; 
measures relating to the common foreign and security policy; measures relating to 
justice and home affairs; international agreements concluded by the Community 
and those concluded by the Member States between themselves in the field of the 
Unions’ activities. Applicant countries have to accept the Community acquis 
before they can join the Union. Derivations from the acquis are granted only in 
exceptional circumstances and are limited in scope. To integrate into the European 
Union, applicant countries will have to transpose the acquis into their national 
legislation and implement it from the moment of their accession. 
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The same precept introduces extremely comprehensive 
authorization for assimilating the legal, regulatory and administrative 
regulations of the Member States,59 with the exception of certain matters 
such as tax regulations, those covering the free movement of people, and 
those affecting employees.  This authorization has served, except where 
specific prohibitions or limitations are in force, as one of the most 
important mechanisms in the extension of Community law.  In addition to 
this, the development has also been based on the jurisprudential doctrine of 
direct effect,60 whereby, except when exercising competences conceded 
under the Treaty, the European Union is empowered to go beyond the 
explicit competences.  
This mechanism, which is also known as the principle of 
subsidiarity, implies overriding and going beyond the rigid concept of 
competence by direct attribution, and achieving maximum applicability in 
all those areas that do not fall either within the domain of national 
sovereignty, or within the exclusive competence of the Community.61 
Through in-depth analysis of that question, then we must ask 
ourselves if there is a sufficient basis of statutory approval to create the 
EIOPA according to the aforementioned Article 95.  In effect, the 
Judgment of 2 May 2006, attempted to resolve the question of whether the 
creation of the European Network and Information Security Agency 
                                                                                                                 
59 See E. LINDE PANIAGUA, POLÍTICAS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA 51, 52 (3rd ed., 
2006).  
60 See Case 22/70, Comm’n v. Council, 1971 E.C.R. 263. The direct effect of 
European law has been enshrined by the Court of Justice in the judgment of Van 
Gend en Loos of 5 February 1963. See Case 26/62, Van 198en den Loos v. 
Nederlandse Adminstratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1. In this judgment, the 
Court states that European law not only engenders obligations for Member States, 
but also rights for individuals. Individuals may therefore take advantage of these 
rights and directly invoke European acts before national and European courts. 
However, it is not necessary for the Member State to adopt the European act 
concerned into its internal legal system. There are two aspects to direct effect: a 
vertical aspect and a horizontal aspect. Vertical direct effect is of consequence in 
relations between individuals and the State. This means that individuals can invoke 
a European provision in relation to the State. Horizontal direct effect is 
consequential in relations between individuals. This means that an individual can 
invoke a European provision in relation to another individual.  
61 See MARTIN A. MANGAS & LINAN D.J. NOUGUERAS, Instituciones y 
Derecho de la Unión Europea 326–30 (1996). 
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(“ENISA”)62 contravenes the EC Treaty, or if Article 95 possesses 
sufficient legislative power to establish such a body.  According to that 
judicial decision, ENISA is a body that does not have the broad powers 
similar to those conferred by the Regulation that created EIOPA.  Instead, 
the legal powers of ENISA are very similar to those of the Committee of 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors, which was 
abolished by the new Regulation.  ENISA’s functions only extend to 
providing information and advice, cooperation, and assistance.  In this 
regard, the European Parliament Legislative Resolution of 22 September 
2010, in which the first or simple reading of the Proposal for a Regulation63 
for setting up the Authority that is the subject of the present study is 
published, does not elaborate on this question, but rather avoids alluding to 
the justification on which the creation of the Authority is based.  It would 
seem that, in light of this frame of mind, perhaps the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities should rule on the issue. 
 
B.  FUNCTIONS 
 
The Regulation is designed to overcome the disadvantages of the 
old Committee of Supervisors.  The anomalous situation, in our view, in 
which the old Committee found itself, due to being a body with 
considerable technical potential, but with purely consultative functions, is 
resolved by the creation of the new Authority.  In this way, then, it is 
entrusted, in areas defined by Community law, with the elaboration of draft 
regulatory technical standards, which do not involve policy choices.  The 
Commission should endorse those draft regulatory technical standards in 
accordance with Community law in order to give them binding legal force.  
At the same time, the process of drawing up technical standards does not 
prejudice the Commission’s powers to adopt, on its own initiative, 
measures whose application is in accordance with the comitology64 
                                                                                                                 
62 Regulation of the European Parliament 460/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 77) 1 (EU). 
63 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Establishing a European Insurance and the Occupational Pensions Authority, 
COM (2009) 502 final (Sept. 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&referenc
e=P7-TA-2010-0334#BKMD-18. 
64 Council Decision 1999/486, 1999 O.J. (D 0486) 2 (EC). In accordance with 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Member States 
implement European law by adopting measures for implementing legal acts into 
their national legislations. In accordance with the principles of subsidiarity and 
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procedures at level two of the Lamfalussy structure, that are laid down in 
the relevant Community legislation. 
The new Authority is set up to be a body with legal personality, 
without usurping the Commission’s powers, and being accountable to the 
                                                                                                                 
proximity, decisions shall be taken as close to the citizens as possible. 
Implementing powers may also be attributed to the Commission so that legislation 
is implemented uniformly in the Member States, or to the Council for 
implementing acts related to the Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union, Oct. 26, 2012 O.J. (C 
326) 58–59. In exercising its implementing powers, the Commission is assisted by 
representatives of the Member States through committees, in accordance with the 
“comitology” procedure. 
The committees are forums for discussion consisting of representatives from 
Member States and are chaired by the Commission. They enable the Commission 
to establish dialogue with national administrations before adopting implementing 
measures. The Commission ensures that measures reflect as far as possible the 
situation in each of the countries concerned. 
Relations between the Commission and the committees are based on models set 
out in the Council “Comitology Decision.” This decision has been amended 
several times. In 1999, it accorded the European Parliament a “right to scrutiny” in 
implementing legislative acts adopted by co-decision. It also increased the 
transparency of the system by making committee documents more accessible to the 
Parliament and the public and by requiring the documents to be registered in a 
public register. 
Council Decision 2006/512, 2006 O.J. (L 200) 11 (EU). The “Comitology 
Decision” was amended again in 2006. It introduced a new way of exercising 
implementing powers: the regulatory procedure with scrutiny. 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union, Oct. 26, 2012 O.J. 
(C 326) 58–59. The Treaty of Lisbon provides that the relationship between the 
Commission and its committees is henceforth organized on the basis of a 
regulation adopted by the European Parliament under the ordinary legislative 
procedure. Until such a regulation is adopted, the Council “Comitology Decision” 
adopted in 2006 is to apply. Committees may be formed in accordance with the 
following typology: advisory committees who give their opinions to the 
Commission, which must try to take account of them; management committees: 
they intervene when implementing measures relate to the management of programs 
and when they have budgetary implications; and regulatory committees: they are 
responsible when the implementing measures relate to legislation applicable in the 
whole of the European Union (EU). Regulatory committees with scrutiny must 
allow the Council and the European Parliament to carry out a check prior to the 
adoption of measures of general scope designed to amend non-essential elements 
of a basic instrument adopted by co-decision. 
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European Council and to the European Parliament.65 Ensuring the correct 
and full application of Community law is a core prerequisite for the 
integrity, transparency, efficiency, and orderly functioning of financial 
markets, the stability of the financial system, and for neutral conditions of 
competition for financial institutions in the Community, including 
protection for the consumer as the end-user. 
 
1. Binding Decisions 
 
Article 17 of the Regulation (EU) No. 1094/2010, establishes a 
mechanism, which allows the Authority to deal with cases of incorrect or 
insufficient application of Community law.  For this purpose, a three-stage 
mechanism is created. 
In the first stage, the Authority is empowered to investigate alleged 
incorrect or insufficient application of Community law obligations by 
national authorities in their supervisory practice, concluded by a 
recommendation, in which the action necessary to comply with Union law 
is set out.  The national authority has the obligation to inform the Authority 
of the steps it has taken, or intends to take, as a result of the 
recommendation. 
The second stage begins when the national authority fails to abide 
by the recommendation and it is necessary to remedy in a timely manner 
such non-compliance in order to maintain or restore neutral conditions of 
competition in the market or ensure the orderly functioning and integrity of 
the financial system.  The Authority may issue an individual decision 
addressed to a financial institution requiring the necessary action to comply 
with its obligations under Union law including the cessation of any 
practice.  All of this is without prejudice to the powers of the Commission 
under Article 258 TFEU.66  
                                                                                                                 
65 This responsibility clause is introduced by Article 1.3 of European 
Parliament Legislative Resolution of 22 September 2010, in which the first or 
simple reading of the Proposal for a Regulation is published. Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a 
European Insurance and the Occupational Pensions Authority, COM (2009) 502 
final (Sept. 22, 2010), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2010-0334#BKMD-
18. 
66 This of course according to the consolidated versions of the Treaty on 
European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and 
their Protocols and Annexes, resulting from the amendments introduced by the 
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Finally, the third stage begins when there are adverse 
developments which may seriously jeopardize the orderly functioning and 
integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the 
financial system in the Union.  The Authority may adopt individual 
decisions requiring competent authorities to take the necessary action, and 
requiring financial institutions to take the necessary action to comply with 
their obligations under Union law including the cessation of any practice. 
 
2.  The Conciliation and Arbitration Function 
 
The Regulation also, in Article 19, endows the Authority with the 
function of carrying out arbitration, in order to ensure effective supervision, 
and a balanced consideration of the positions held by the national 
supervisory authorities of the different Member States.  The procedure is 
divided into two phases.  In the first, a conciliation phase should be 
provided for during which the national supervisory authorities may reach 
an agreement.  At that stage, the Authority shall act as a mediator.  If the 
authorities fail to reach an agreement, then the second phase is initiated.  In 
the second, the Authority may take a decision requiring them to take 
specific action or to refrain from action in order to settle the matter, in 
accordance with Community law.  This Decision is binding on the 
competent authorities in question in order to ensure compliance with Union 
law.  The decisions adopted shall prevail over any previous decision 
adopted by the competent authorities on the same matter.67 
On the basis of this last paragraph, the Authority is to assess 
whether it is competent to make a ruling on the resolution of the particular 
case.  If the Authority considers that it is competent to resolve the 
disagreement it will make a ruling.  The ruling is binding since, if the 
supervisory authority does not conform to this resolution, then the 
Authority has the power to adopt an individual decision, addressed to the 
                                                                                                                 
Treaty of Lisbon signed on 13 December 2007 in Lisbon, that took effect on 1 
December 2009. 2010 O.J. (C 38) 13. 
67 Regulation introduced in Art. 11.4.2 of European Parliament Legislative 
Resolution of 22 September 2010, in which is published the first or simple reading 
of the Proposal for a Regulation. Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council Establishing a European Insurance and the 
Occupational Pensions Authority, COM (2009) 502 final (Sept. 22, 2010), 
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type= 
TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2010-0334#BKMD-18 
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financial entity, urging it to take the necessary action to comply with its 
obligations under Community law including the cessation of any practice. 
Finally, from a reading of Article 19, there are two limitations on 
this power.  In the first place, where there exists in Community law a 
remedy for the conflict, or a mechanism for resolving the type of conflict 
that falls outside the Authority’s competence, it will refrain from settling 
the case and point out to the parties the proper place for the resolution of 
the disagreement.  The second limitation arises when the Commission 
holds the power of resolution over the conflict. 
 
3.  Delegation of Tasks and Responsibilities 
 
The Regulation also authorizes the delegation of tasks and 
responsibilities in order to reduce the duplication of supervisory tasks, to 
foster cooperation and thereby streamline the supervisory process, and to 
reduce the burden imposed on financial institutions.  Delegation of tasks 
means that tasks are carried out by a supervisory authority other than the 
responsible authority, while the responsibility for supervisory decisions 
remains with the delegating authority.  Through the delegation of 
responsibilities, a national supervisory authority, the authority delegated to, 
should be able to decide upon a certain supervisory matter in the name and 
stead of another national supervisory authority.  On this basis, 
responsibility may be delegated to the Authority itself or to other 
authorities. 
Delegations should be governed by the principle of allocating 
supervisory competence to a supervisor, which is best technically qualified 
to take action.  In this respect, the Authority must be informed in order to 
issue a prior notice about it, should this in its view be necessary. 
 
4.  Regulatory and Implementing Technical Standards 
 
The Authority is empowered to adopt regulatory technical 
standards and implementing technical standards under the provisions of 
Articles 10 and 15 of the Regulation. 
Regulatory technical standards are designed to address technical 
issues, and shall not imply strategic decisions or policy choices and their 
content shall be delimited by the legislative acts on which they are based.  
Before submitting them to the Commission, the Authority shall conduct 
open public consultations on draft regulatory technical standards, and 
analyse the potential related costs and benefits, unless such consultations 
and analyses are disproportionate in relation to the scope and impact of the 
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draft regulatory technical standards concerned or in relation to the 
particular urgency of the matter. 
It is important to note that when the Authority does not submit a 
draft regulatory technical standard to the Commission within the time 
limits, then the Commission may adopt a regulatory technical standard by 
means of a delegated act without a draft from the Authority. 
As regards the second type, implementing technical standards shall 
be technical, shall not imply strategic decisions or policy choices, because 
those subjects are enacted by the European Council or the Commission, 
and their content shall be to determine the conditions of application of 
those acts.  The Authority shall submit its draft implementing technical 
standards to the Commission for endorsement.  The approval procedure is 
the same as that for the approval of regulatory technical standards. 
 
5.  The Advisory Function 
 
As we have seen thus far, the Regulation places emphasis on the 
creation of an Authority with powers of decision.  But, its antecedents as a 
consultative body are not abolished and must be kept in mind; rather, those 
powers are broadened.  In effect, with respect to the field of insurance and 
occupational pensions, the Authority functions as a consultative body, not 
only as advisor to the Commission, but now also to the European 
Parliament, and to the European Council. 
Besides, and with the objective of ensuring full effectiveness of the 
functioning of the European Systemic Risk Board (“ESRB”)68 and the 
                                                                                                                 
68 The ESRB is responsible for the macro-prudential oversight of the financial 
system in the EU. One of its main objectives is to prevent and mitigate systemic 
risks which might prejudice the financial stability of the EU. In this regard, the 
ESRB must in particular: determine and collect the information necessary for its 
action; identify systemic risks and prioritize them; issue warnings and make them 
public if necessary; recommend measures to be taken once the risks have been 
identified. The ESRB is composed of: a General Board to ensure the performance 
of tasks; a Steering Committee which contributes to the decision-making process; a 
Secretariat responsible for day-to-day business; an Advisory Scientific Committee 
and an Advisory Technical Committee to provide advice and assistance. The 
President of the European Central Bank (ECB) shall chair the ESRB for a term of 
five years. The Chair will perform his duties assisted by two Vice-Chairs, the first 
of which shall be elected by and from the General Council of the ECB, while the 
second shall be the Chair of the Joint Committee. Members of the ESRB shall have 
an obligation to comply with the principles of impartiality and professional secrecy 
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follow-up to its warnings and recommendations, the Authority must 
provide it with all relevant information.  Upon receipt of warnings or 
recommendations addressed by the European Systemic Risk Board to the 
Authority or a national supervisory authority, the Authority should ensure 
follow-up. 
 
C.  INTERNAL ORGANIZATION 
 
Chapter III of the Regulation is entitled “Organisation,” and 
contains four sections describing the bodies that constitute EIOPA. 
Section 1 authorizes the Board of Supervisors, presided over by 
the Chairperson, who is non-voting, and consisting of the heads of the 
competent national public authorities of each Member State.  The Board’s 
function is to give guidance to the work of the Authority and to adopt the 
opinions, recommendations and decisions, and to issue the advice referred 
to in Chapter II, concerning the Authority’s tasks and responsibilities.  The 
Board also adopts the Authority’s multi-annual work programme and 
exercises disciplinary authority over the Chairperson and Executive 
Director, including the power to remove them from office if necessary. 
Section 2 creates the Management Board, which is presided over 
by the Authority’s Chairperson.  The Management Board’s role is to ensure 
that the Authority carries out its mission, to propose an annual and multi-
annual work programme, to exercise its budgetary powers in accordance 
with the Regulation, and to adopt the Authority’s staff policy plan. 
Section 3 designates the Chairperson, who may be appointed by 
the Board of Supervisors, and who may be removed from office only by the 
Parliament, following a decision of the Board.  The Chairperson’s term of 
                                                                                                                 
when performing their duties, including after their duties have ceased. Meetings of 
the General Board shall take place four times a year, preceded by meetings of the 
Steering Committee. The Chair of the ESRB may convene extraordinary meetings. 
The ESRB may also seek the advice of the private sector when necessary. Finally, 
The ESRB may issue warnings and make recommendations concerning remedial 
action to be adopted, or even legislative initiatives. Such recommendations may be 
addressed: to the EU; to one or several Member States; to one or several European 
supervisory authorities; to one or several national supervisory authorities. 
Recommendations relating to measures to be adopted shall be issued according to a 
color code which varies according to the level of risk. If the ESRB observes that its 
recommendations have not been followed, it shall, confidentially, inform the 
addressees, the Council and, where relevant, the European Supervisory Authority 
concerned. 
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office is five years and may be extended once. The Chairperson shall 
neither seek nor take instructions from Union institutions or bodies, from 
any government of a Member State, or from any other public or private 
body. 
Section 4 creates the post of the Executive Director, who is 
appointed by the Board of Supervisors, on the basis of merit, skills, 
knowledge of financial institutions and markets, and experience relevant to 
financial supervision and regulation and managerial experience, following 
an open selection procedure.  The Executive Director is in charge of the 
management of the Authority and prepares the work of the Management 
Board.  The Executive Director is also responsible for implementing the 
annual work programme of the Authority, and shall take the necessary 
measures, notably the adoption of internal administrative instructions and 
the publication of notices, to ensure the functioning of the Authority.  
Finally, each year the Executive Director shall prepare a draft report with a 
section on the regulatory and supervisory activities of the Authority and a 
section on financial and administrative matters. 
 
D. BODIES SET UP BY THE REGULATION 
 
Chapter IV, dealing with Joint Bodies of the European Supervisory 
Authorities, establishes in its Section 1 the Joint Committee of European 
Supervisory Authorities and in its Section 2 the Board of Appeal. 
The purpose of the Joint Committee is to serve as a forum in which 
the Authority shall cooperate regularly and closely and ensure cross-
sectoral consistency with the European Banking Authority and the 
European Securities and Markets Authority.  It is composed of the 
Chairperson of the Authority and the Chairpersons of the Authorities 
aforementioned.  Within the Committee there shall be a Sub-Committee on 
financial conglomerates and further Sub-Committees as may be deemed 
necessary. 
The Board of Appeal shall be a joint body of the European 
Banking Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority and the European Securities and Markets Authority.  It shall be 
composed of six members and six alternates with a proven record of 
relevant knowledge and experience, excluding current staff of the 
competent authorities or other national or Community institutions involved 
in the activities of the Authority.  Any natural or legal person, including 
competent authorities, may appeal a decision of the Authority.  Such an 
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appeal shall not have suspensive69 effect. Finally, decisions taken by the 
Board of Appeal may be contested before the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, in accordance with Article 263 TFEU. 
 
X. CONCLUSION 
 
The history of the succession Committees up to the present day, 
namely those concerned with the whole field of financial services is 
commendable for the attempts to achieve convergence between the 
different national standards.  In effect, in the context of the multiplicity of 
standards and of the fragmented nature of the market within the 
Community, actually being able to find the point of inflection, where those 
regulations can coincide with a view to constructing a unified market, is no 
mean feat.  In our opinion, developing the Committees for the purpose of 
promoting their technical advice was the source of the great profusion of 
working materials from which it has been possible to construct a common 
supervisory and regulatory body. 
Along with all this material, the Lamfalussy process and its review 
have led to the amendment of a broad spectrum of directives aimed at 
unifying supervisory criteria as the conditio sine qua non for the attainment 
of this common market.  The creation of a single supra-national Authority 
can be regarded as the high point of an entire process of unification of 
principles of finance that provides this body with the power to issue 
resolutions without having any destabilizing effect, both in Community and 
in national markets.  Certainly, the different intra-community markets, in 
spite of their interconnections, and taking account of their particular 
individual nature and characteristics, cannot allow themselves to be 
affected by the decision of a supra-national body that upsets a given market 
and distorts the ends it is designed to serve.  This is why the work of 
legislative convergence is a ceaseless task, and involves constant 
assessment of its consequences. 
It is also the case that the Lamfalussy process constitutes a major 
challenge in supra-Community terms.  The increasing globalization that we 
are experiencing today, makes easier the movement and investment of 
foreign capital, both to create new enterprises and to develop existing ones.  
This is why one of the objectives of the process has been to project to the 
outside world the image of a strong and solid Community market, which, 
                                                                                                                 
69 It means that the Decisions enacted by the Authority can be implemented, 
and the appeals cannot stop the Decision’s effects. 
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thanks to this appearance, is able to attract investors who are willing to 
participate in a business environment that is secure, both from the point of 
view of standards and of economic prospects.  As a result, the regulation 
and supervision of insurance and of the other financial services needs to be 
developed in such a way as to simultaneously promote mutual confidence 
between the different supervisors, with a view to avoiding having investors 
perceive distortions or tensions concerned with legislation.  In this respect, 
the creation of the Committee of Supervisors by the Decision of 23 January 
2009 promoted the move towards convergence of the different national 
supervisors.  That was in our view a very successful move, in that the 
Committee embodied the supra-national ethos that was needed to permeate 
supervisory practice in the nations.  As we can see, that drawing together 
has not yet been achieved as fully as would be desired. 
The reluctance, on the part of national authorities to relinquish 
competences in matters of financial market governance has been a constant 
factor, in spite of the aspiration towards integration.  The European Council 
included in its conclusions of 19 June 2009 reference to the standstill in the 
financial market.  The Council was of the view that it would be helpful to 
take a further step forward in this matter and to set up a supra-national 
supervisory body that would at least draw together the functions of the 
national supervisors, even if this were initially in a somewhat tentative 
manner. 
The new European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority 
is constituted as a joint body, because of the disparity of the tasks attributed 
to it by the Proposal for a Regulation. The advisory function, the oversight 
of the incorrect or insufficient application of Community law, the 
production of proposals, and the delegation of functions, all lead us to 
suspect that in the future this Authority will be the sole supervisory body 
operating in all Member States.  This is also likely true for the similar 
arrangements governing banking supervision and securities regulation.  For 
sure, it seems likely that we are progressing towards a new conception as 
regards the supervision and regulation of insurance in our country, or 
perhaps what we are witnessing is another step towards Community-wide 
integration. 
